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Abstract : 
 
South Africa invests in the agricultural sector of 28 African countries, through the export of 
its farmers, its food processing industries, and its technical and managerial expertise. Its role 
in this conquest is one of a directly implicated actor as well as of an intermediary. In the first 
case, South Africa’s farmers seeking new opportunities associate themselves with the during 
the apartheid era established agrarian capital structures in order to expand their respective 
markets or to look for alternatives to the historic and political context and land question of 
the country. In the second case, South Africa’s agrarian capital associates itself with national 
and international financial capital, making the country a stepping stone for the diversification 
of portfolio’s of the entire world and any sector. In both cases, the South African government 
facilitates the process, through the implementation of BITs and the negotiation of preferential 
trade agreements.  
 
Based on empirical work in South Africa and in the host countries of South African 
investments, this paper presents the geopolitical strategy of the country with regards Africa’s 
farming sector.  On one hand, it presents the different investment models developed by the 
South Africans. On the other hand, it details the alliances between actors – South Africans 
and others, originating from the farming sector and beyond – and the instruments developed 
aiming at engaging this “new South African great trek”. The paper emphasizes that South 
Africa exports a paradigm based on large-scale commercial and corporate agriculture, 
following the example of its own agrarian society. Even if South Africa’s Minister of 
Agriculture, Joemat-Pettersson, affirms not to be supporting the export of apartheid, the 
country certainly contributes to the development of a highly capitalistic and dual farm sector, 
which she needs for her expansion.  
 
Résumé : 
 
L’Afrique du Sud investit dans l’agriculture de 28 pays africains, par l’exportation de ses 
agriculteurs, de son industrie agroalimentaire, et de son expertise technique et managériale. 
L’Afrique du Sud y joue un rôle d’acteur directement impliqué tout comme d’agent 
intermédiaire. Dans le premier cas, les agriculteurs sud-africains à la recherche de nouvelles 
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opportunités s’associent avec le capital agraire établie pendant l’apartheid pour soit étendre 
leurs marchés réciproques, soit trouver des alternatives à la situation historico-politique et 
foncière du pays. Dans le deuxième cas, le capital agraire sud-africain s’associe avec le 
capital financier national et international faisant du pays un tremplin pour la diversification 
de portefeuilles d’investisseurs du monde entier et de tout secteur. Dans les deux cas, le 
gouvernement sud-africain facilite le processus, à travers la mise en place de traités 
d’investissement bilatéraux et la négociation de régimes commerciaux préférentiels. 
 
Basé sur des recherches empiriques en Afrique du Sud et dans les pays hôtes des 
investissements sud-africains, ce papier présentera la stratégie géopolitique du pays en ce qui 
concerne l’agriculture africaine. D’une part, il présentera les différents modèles 
d’investissement que les sud-africains développent. D’autre part, il détaillera les alliances 
entre acteurs – sud-africains et autres, issues du secteur agricole ou non - et les instruments 
mis en place afin d’engager ce « nouveau grand trek sud-africain ». Le papier soutient ainsi 
que l’Afrique du Sud exporte un paradigme basé sur l’agriculture à grande échelle voire de 
firme, à l’instar de sa propre société agraire. Même si la ministre de l’agriculture sud-
africaine Joemat-Pettersson affirme ne pas vouloir supporter l’exportation de l’apartheid, le 
pays contribue certainement au développement d’un secteur capitaliste et dual, dont elle a 
besoin pour son expansion.  
 
 
 
 
  
Structural transformation and new actors and alliances in South Africa’s 
agrarian sector  
 
While structural transformations in South Africa’s agricultural sector do not occur where 
expected and are not made possible from within (Anseeuw, 2013), changes do occur lately 
related to the engagement of actors linked to the financial markets.  The latter represent the 
emergence, into this frozen landscape, of a new form of capital, i.e. the “financial capital”4, 
coming from beyond the orthodox and historical boundaries of South Africa’s agricultural 
sector. This “financial capital” is embodied by a plurality of actors, raising funds on financial 
markets and allocating and managing it into a portfolio of assets. Currently, commercial 
banks, pension funds, endowment funds, as well as development financial institutions or 
insurance companies are investing into South African agriculture and agro-industries. This 
attraction seems to be driven firstly by the “multiple food-energy-climate-finance crisis” 
(Margulis 2013), triggered in 2008-09 globally, which led to a renewed interest in agriculture 
from financial markets. Confronted with uncertainties affecting ‘traditional’ financial assets 
(e.g. bonds, equities), these financial investors diversify their portfolios, integrating more and 
more ‘emergent’ assets.  Driven by the macro-economic projections around global population 
and rising food prices (Daniels, 2012), and encouraged by the American and the South 
American farm model innovations5, financial investors are more and more looking for an 
exposure into agriculture and agribusiness. In addition, agriculture is often perceived as a 
strong hedge against inflation as agricultural products are integrated in the commodities 
basket of inflation. As such, inside the financial industries, agriculture and agribusiness are 
more and more considered as an asset class (Ducastel and Anseeuw, 2013; Chen et al 2013). 
This is particularly the case in South Africa, where the increased liberalisation and 
deregulation of its economy and agricultural sector (Vink and Kirsten, 2000) and the presence 
of the above presented well-structured instruments, in particular the futures market for 
agricultural commodities (SAFEX) as well as a range of risk management instruments to 
investors, present a convenient base for financial innovations. The countries’ land resources 
and its role as a regional power also stimulate the interest of investors in this market, not only 
as a laboratory for new agricultural and investment practices (Ducastel and Anseeuw, 2013) 
but also as a stepping stone towards other regions on the continent (Hall, 2011). 
 
These financial actors often perceive agriculture as two asset classes. On one hand, farmland 
is a property such as real estate, with investors expecting a return from its appreciation over 
time. On the other hand, farming and agribusiness operations produce agricultural 
commodities, and thus subsequently wealth, with investors endeavoring to capture the latter 
along the value chain. Both investments are driven by the very same factors but produce 
different structures of investments and production. To ”unlock” these and to penetrate the 
agricultural sector, financial investors implement different strategies. Indeed, the source of the 
capital, mainly related to their liability structures (Aglietta & Rigot 2009), weighs 
significantly on the investment policy, and thus on their choice and expectations regarding 
agriculture. Some of the investors acquire shares of agricultural or agribusiness listed 
companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. For instance, South Africa’s Public 
Investment Corporation (PIC), which manages the“Government Employees Pension Fund”, 
holds significant positions in the country’s bigger agro-food listed companies (Tiger Food, 
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Woolworths, etc.) (Greenberg, 2009). Silverlands fund, a London-based private equity fund 
owns 30,2% of Crookes Brothers – a major corporate venture engaged in primary agricultural 
production in South and Southern Africa (Crookes Brothers, 2013). Other investors prefer to 
purchase commit into a financial vehicle, either listed on the stock exchange or privately 
owned, specialized in the sector (private equity fund, property fund, holding company, etc.). 
For example, Zeder, a public holding company on the JSE has been launched in 2006 by 
leading asset management company PSG, , is currently managing four agribusiness portfolios 
ranging from primary production in Zambia to the seed industry (Zeder, 2013). In the case of 
a private equity fund, the financial vehicle pursues a private equity over-taking strategy by 
removing the shares out of the stock exchange (Burch and Lawrence, 2012, p….). But private 
equity funds can also target privately owned companies and play a more passive role in the 
daily management; for instance, the Agri-Vie Food and Agribusiness Fund acquired a 
minority stake into several private agribusiness companies in South Africa (Thomas, 2012). 
Finally, new players arise in the sector through partnerships or support by financial 
institutions. This is illustrated by Farmsecure, an agricultural service provider which started in 
2004 and is active along the value chain. Farmsecure benefits from attractive finance 
provision through a contractual partnership with Standard Chartered Bank. 
 
Although the financial channels into South Africa’s agriculture are diverse, these investors 
tend to develop production models and management strategies which revolve around the very 
same mechanisms and principles. Indeed, financial capital deploying in the agricultural sector 
pushes for specific production patterns. 
 
South Africa’s agrarian conquest and the export of its production model(s) 
 
Since 1994 and especially in the last decade, South Africa’s agrarian and corporate capital 
have been looking for opportunities in other African countries and are presently contributing 
to the export of the South African agricultural model across the continent (Hall 2012, 
Bernstein 2013). Their spread over the continent has taken place through three different 
strategies: the export of farmers, expertise and agribusinesses. 
 
For several years, there has been a movement of independent South African farmers 
establishing elsewhere in Southern Africa.  They are today present in 28 African countries, 
and according to informal sources up to 800 South African farmers tried to settle in 
Mozambique and 300 in Zambia. These farmers acquired (or tried to) a few hundred, or in 
some cases a few thousands, hectares in order to develop a production model based on the 
South African commercial farm model. These farmers have engaged in various production 
patterns, although mostly  focusing on high value-added commodities produced according to 
labor-intensive farming systems (mainly in the fruit sector - mango, banana, citrus, as well as 
tobacco, soy and cattle sectors).  
 
Some of these farmers ‘lost’ (i.e. sold at market value) their farm(s) in the framework of 
South Africa’s land reform programme, others were progressively squeezed out of the South 
African market (through the continuous increase of the cost of labor and farm inputs as well 
as the necessity to regularly upgrade the level of mechanization to be able to compete on the 
international market in a liberalized economic environment). This being said, many of them 
still have and maintain agricultural activities in South Africa. Settling and developing 
agricultural activities abroad is thus not always a last resort, it also represents a way of 
benefiting from cheap land and labour, expanding their activities and conquering new and less 
developed markets. Many of these farmers are failing, though. Although technical difficulties 
and institutional uncertainties are major factors for failure, the difficulty to access financial 
services and the high level of transaction costs in Africa’s less developed agrarian economies, 
constitute main difficulties these farmers face. 
 
The second modality is related to the export of South Africa’s agricultural expertise. In the 
present context of a changing agricultural sector in Africa, characterized by high competition 
between investors interested in farmland for large scale farming, there is a clear premium on 
management skills. As such, South African commercial farmers are becoming the target of an 
expressed demand for their skills in farm management by investors acquiring land in Africa 
(Hall 2012). Agri-SA emphasized that they have been invited, either as farmers or as 
managers, by more than 42 countries in Africa (ref). Directly engaged from South Africa or 
recycled from the above mentioned failing independent activities. 
 
Although these two first categories represent the export of part of South Africa’s agrarian 
capital, the countries corporate and financial ones are – although since more recently, at least 
regarding agriculture – accompanying the trend. In search of new markets, these major South 
African economic actors are expanding towards less developed countries on the continent. 
South African agribusiness specialized in farm inputs (Pannar, Omnia), processing (Illovo and 
Tongaat-Hulet), packaging (Westfalia) and integrated service providers (Unitrans) are 
developing activities all over Southern Africa. Furthermore, several of the now privatized 
former cooperatives, in particular AFGRI and …, are now engaging in Southern Africa and 
beyond, offering their financial and technical services. Also, South Africa’s major retailers 
and supermarkets are presently mushrooming all over, with the Checkers group, Woolworths 
and Pick&Pay leading the race. Outside South Africa, Woolworths – South africa’s luxury 
retail store - currently has 46 stores in ten African countries, namely Botswana, Namibia, 
Lesotho, Swaziland, Ghana, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Mozambique. They are 
presently also opening stores in Nigeria and Angola6.  
 
Although representing different modalities and having appeared in different phases, the export 
of agrarian, corporate and financial capital are complementing each other. Many of the 
struggling independent farmers are presently benefitting from the rapid development of 
agricultural services, technical as well as financial; the agribusinesses and retailers are from 
their side dependent on the development of larger-scale farming enterprises. It leads to the 
development of renewed production models in African countries, varying from contract 
farming to in-grower schemes as well as to more integrated models based on joint-ventures 
and nucleus-estates (Boche and Anseeuw, 2013). It also let to institutional innovations. One 
of them has been the initiative developed by Agri SA, facilitating the establishment of South 
African farmers in African countries. It is well-illustrated by the acquisition of land – an 
agreement has been reached regarding 80 000ha of a State farm in the Congo Republic for the 
establishment of Congo-Agriculture, a cooperative of South African farmers (Hall 2012, 
Boche and Anseeuw 2013). These dynamics and the different complementarities, pushed by 
the broader rush for Africa’s resources (ref), presently structure a broader wave of a more 
organized expansion of South Africa’s capital into Africa’s agrarian economy. A coordinated 
momentum seems to gain speed between these actors and several internal aspects are 
contributing to it. Firstly, based on their experiences in Congo, Agri-Sa is organizing the 
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sector, and more particularly South African farmers abroad, in order to expand their activities. 
It does so by accessing land and negotiating favorable conditions with the host countries’ 
government as well as facilitating access to finance, support services and contracts by, beside 
other strategies, partnering with agribusinesses. For instance, Agri-SA not only formalized 
agreements with AFGRI in support of their activities in Africa; they also formed a recognized 
structure in Mozambique, AgriSaMoz, initiating to organize the sector and their activities. 
Agri-Sa, with the aim of generalizing such more coordinated activities, has recently 
established its AgriAllAfrica platform.7 Secondly, this export is reinforced through the 
involvement of South Africa’s financial capital, looking to conquer new markets and develop 
their activities in gradually more deregulated and liberalized economies. This is mainly 
illustrated by three South African commercial banks (Standard, ABSA and Standard 
Chartered) that support the expansion of South African farmers through the continent (Hall 
2012). Moreover, the export of financial capital also involves financial actors such as asset 
management companies. While based in South Africa, the large majority of these companies 
already developed projects in Southern Africa and are trying to expand their activities on the 
continent. Emvest is one of the most telling examples of this phenomenon. At first, the 
endowment fund acquired land in several African countries and started to raise financial 
capital in South Africa and abroad to develop farming activities with the aim to supply their 
retail facility in South Africa. Then, they started to develop retail opportunities with 
supermarkets based in the country where they invest. In this context, they are in charge of the 
implementation of the Pick’n Pay network in Mozambique and are trying to implement 
contract schemes with fruit and veggies local producers. Thirdly, platforms are getting 
organized in order to promote and facilitate the conquest of the continent, in name of the 
necessary economic expansion and economies of scale in an increasingly competitive world. 
As such, Agri4Africa8 or how we made it in Africa9, established in 2010, is opening up 
“Africa’s agribusinesses information highways”, aiming at (South African) business people as 
well as foreign investors with an interest in the continent.  
 
The South African government is also active in promoting the export of South African 
agricultural actors and model. The national Government has engaged in the negotiation and 
establishment of several bilateral investment treaties (BITs). Just in the last three years, BITs 
were signed with Angola, Cameroon, DRC, Gabon, Guinea, Ethiopia, Madagascar, 
Mauritania, Namibia, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Representing ‘Agreement[s] 
on Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investment’, they often associate memoranda of 
understanding on ‘Cooperation in the Field of Agriculture’ (Hall, 2011). Provincial 
governements are also partaking as illustrated by the drafting of an “International Relations 
and Africa” strategy by the International Relations Directorate in the department of the 
Premier of the Western Cape Province.  This document “provides the analysis and framework 
for ensuring a coherent and meaningful approach in the Western Cape’s bilateral relations on 
the continent and build on the solid foundation already in place”10. Another initiative of the 
Western Cape Government is the organization of Africa Day, a platform of information 
gathering government departments, investors, businesses and service providers, promoting 
and “driving to create opportunities for growth and jobs by positioning the region to benefit 
from the untapped trade and economic potential available in rest of sub-Saharan”11. 
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This conquest is presently being organized through the development of different production 
and investment models. Indeed, six investment models orchestrated by South African farmers, 
agribusinesses, and investment funds, are identified.  
 
Table: The Different Large-Scale Land Acquisition Models 
Models Independent 
farmer 
model 
Cooperative 
farmer 
model 
Speculative 
1,000-day 
model 
Asset 
management 
model 
Contracting 
model 
Agribusiness 
Estate 
model 
Variants and Sub-models 
 
-Independent 
farmers 
-Delocalized 
auxiliary farming 
model 
-Resource pooling 
farmers 
Cooperative 
farmer model 
1000-day 
model 
Asset 
management 
model 
-Contract 
farming 
-Nucleus Estate 
-Reverse 
Tenancy 
-Ingrower 
scheme 
Agribusiness 
Model 
Set up and organization 
Mechanisms of 
Governance Independent 
Cooperative 
(hybrid) 
Financial 
corporate 
(hybrid) 
Financial 
corporate 
(hybrid) 
Processing 
corporate 
(hybrid) 
Agribusiness 
(corporate) 
Actors involved 
Independent farmer 
and some informal 
groupings 
Union, 
cooperative, 
farmers, 
Developer/cons
ultant, financer 
Asset 
management 
company, 
financer 
Agribusiness 
already 
established 
and local farmers 
Agribusiness 
Investment 
(structure) 
Independent funds Investment 
secured by the 
cooperative 
Private equity 
partner 
Private equity 
partner 
Agribusiness Agribusiness 
Average size of 
the project 
<1,000 ha 10,000 – 80,000 
ha 
5,000-10,000 ha 5,000-10,000 ha > 5,000 ha > 10,000 ha 
Establishment/
Access to land 
Implementation 
started at local level 
Bilateral treaty; 
Top down 
decision process 
 
Acquisition of 
old state farms 
facilitated by 
political 
network 
Takeover of old 
state farms; 
Expansion on 
surrounding area 
Already 
established 
agribusiness; 
Support from 
donors to 
identify 
outgrowers and 
secure land 
access 
Centralized 
decision; 
Top down 
decision 
process; 
Takeover of 
failed projects 
Contracting/ 
agreement 
No contracting National 
bilateral 
agreements; 
Farmers with 
cooperative 
Too early or for 
prospective 
purposes 
Possible off-set 
contracts 
(transport, 
logistic, value 
chain service 
providers) 
Production and 
marketing 
contracts 
National 
bilateral 
agreements; 
Possible off-
set contracts 
(land clearing 
and transport) 
-Degree of 
vertical 
integration 
Little Little Relatively high Relatively high to High High 
Total vertical 
integration 
Result, outcome, sustainability 
Mechanisms for 
Sharing rent 
N/A Cooperative – 
salaries and 
paid out to 
cooperative 
members 
Dividend on 
margin made 
Shares of the 
asset 
management 
company 
Depending on 
the contract 
N/A as 
integrated 
Outcome 
Farming production Farming 
production; 
Transfer of 
technology; 
Geopolitical 
influence 
Farming 
infrastructure;  
ROI for 
financer 
Farming 
production;  
ROI for financer 
Farming 
production and 
processing 
Farming, 
processing 
Level of failure High 
Too early or for 
prospective 
purposes 
High Relatively High Low Low 
Inclusiveness and national/local development 
Ownership/ 
Voice/ 
Risk/Reward 
into core 
activities 
Mentorship within 
informal grouping 
None None None Contract 
farming, nucleus 
Estate 
management 
contract 
Development 
as “enclave 
economy” 
Local benefits Land taxes;  Land taxes; None Land taxes  Land taxes; Land taxes; 
Labor intensive 
model; 
Some collective 
action with local 
emergent farmers 
Labor intensive 
production 
model 
 
Employment 
creation volatile 
Productive 
uplifting and 
market access; 
Labor intensive 
production 
model 
Compensation;  
Highly 
mechanized 
production 
model 
 
Independent Farmers 
 
This model is based on the establishment of large independent family farms, mainly based on 
South Africa’s traditional commercial farm model. Found in every Southern African country, 
certain countries seem to be more appealing to this type of investors than others. For example, 
Mozambique and Zambia, among others, attract significant numbers of South African (up to 
800 in Mozambique and 300 in Zambia according to informal sources). 
 
In this case, land is acquired at the local level, often negotiated through local authorities. The 
areas acquired vary from a few hundred hectares to few thousand hectares (generally less than 
2,000 ha). The activities are developed independently, with the production mainly focusing on 
basic market production, going for the more profitable market opportunities, whether they are 
domestic or international.12 They engage in various production patterns, although mostly in 
fruits (mango, banana, citrus), tobacco, soy and cattle. A common characteristic is the focus 
on high value-added commodities produced according to labor-intensive farming systems. 
The investment capital originates mainly from previous savings or still on-going activities 
(mainly in the home country). This is related to the major difficulties these farmers face in 
accessing financial services.  
 
Cooperative model 
 
An institutional innovation of agricultural investment models observed is the establishment of 
cooperative farmers’ structures facilitating the development of farming operations in the host 
country. This cooperative model is often based on multi-level governance structures varying 
from agricultural unions, established in the country of origin and developing activities abroad, 
to the development of farmer cooperatives and the establishment of farmers with collective 
and individual operations in the host countries. Analyzed examples of this model are Congo-
Agriculture in the Republic of Congo and AgriSA-Moz in Mozambique, both engaging South 
African farmers. 
 
These cooperative structures engage in several activities: 
o Representing the interests of the farmers engaged abroad; 
o Negotiating with national authorities on behalf of the farmers in order to obtain access to 
land and benefit from certain advantages (level of tax, insurance, support for 
infrastructure development, import/export benefits, etc.); 
o Establish and support the productive base (cooperative set-up, i.e. screen farmers, 
coordinate farmers, secure funding, empower members technically and institutionally, 
etc.) 
On average, the total area concerned depends on the number of farmers involved but generally 
covers several tens of thousands of hectares (10,000 ha-80,000 ha). 
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The 1,000-day model 
 
This model has the objective to make available a ready-to-start large farm operating in food or 
biofuel production on the international market in approximately three years (hence the 1,000 
day model). The rationale of this hybrid model is based on two assumptions: 
 
o an anticipation of a future demand for land for food and biofuel production; 
o the significant increase of land value at the time the farm is ready to produce (and can be 
sold to an agribusiness company or an investment fund). 
 
The 1,000-day model can be defined as “land speculation”. On one hand, a developer, i.e. a 
consultant/entrepreneur often locally integrated but with strong foreign (South African or 
other but often based in South Africa) business linkages, secures large-scale land rights. On 
the other hand, a “financer”, generally foreign agribusinesses (generally listed on a stock 
exchange market), investment funds or private equity investors, provides the financial 
resource (without directly engaging in the operations). The developer is either in charge of all 
the activities (in order to reduce risk) or, as is often the case, sub-contracts parts of the 
activities to service providers. Because of the short timeframe of the project and the high level 
of risks and uncertainties, contracts are characterized by high level coordination established 
by the entrepreneur. The Inhassune plantation and project C3, both in the Inhambane province 
in Mozambique, are examples of this model. The expectation is to raise on average a 30% 
return on investment after 3 years, equivalent to a 1,000 day establishment plan on farms of, 
on average, between 5,000 and 10,000 ha. The process to acquire the land or the right to use it 
is centralized. The developer uses political relations and networks, including within the 
relevant Ministries such as, for example, the Ministry of Agriculture, to facilitate the land 
acquisition process. Theoretically, after three years, once the farm is established and when the 
marginal profit starts decreasing, the farm is sold.13 
 
The Asset Management Companies model 
 
This model is characterized by the use of an asset management company as link between 
financial and business corporates willing to invest in agriculture. Many of them have there 
asset management company basis in South Africa, with activities being developed on the 
continent (although generally in geographically close-by or politically and economically more 
stable countries). It is the case of  
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 In comparison to the 1,000-day model, the objective of the asset management company model 
is not speculative but productive. The financers are investment funds, willing to invest in 
agriculture. Several types of investors, presently negotiating their engagement or already 
actively involved, were identified, including: endowment funds (Emvest; Zeder-Chayton 
operations in the Mkushi farm block in the Zambia’s Central province.); corporates (SAB-
Miller), listed funds (Trading Emission PLC), private equity funds (BSX) and development 
finance institutions (The South African based Phatisa, with funding from the several 
international cooperation agencies including the French AFD) (Ducastel and Anseeuw, 2013). 
As financial institutions, they do not directly engage in the agricultural activities. The latter is 
engaged in by the fund managers and the asset management companies who play a central 
role in the fund-models set-up.  
 
Two established process are found on the ground. Firstly, investors launch a tender for a 
manager with a specific mandate; or secondly, which was more often found on the ground in 
the developing countries, the asset management company takes the lead in defining and 
establishing the project, while trying to get financers on board. In any case, asset management 
companies are responsible for the effective work on the ground, including fund management, 
project set-up and management (from land access and production to the organization of output 
markets), etc. The asset management company can either develop the land itself or contract 
specialized service providers. For example, The Niqel jatropha project in Buzi (Mozambique) 
invested in all the heavy machinery (bulldozer and excavators) needed to realize the land 
preparation (an initial investment of over US$4,000,000 financed by the Dutch Jatropha 
Consortium), whereas the SunBioFuel project in Manica (Mozambique) subcontracted 
specialized service providers, Unitrans and Pressa, which were already well established in the 
road construction and forestry sectors. 
 
Contracting model 
 
The main characteristic of this model is its structuration around contractual arrangements for 
production. This model can exist in its most simplified format, such as contract farming, or as 
more complex institutional arrangements, such as i) a nucleus-estates (SAB-Miller in 
Tanzani; ii) a “reverse tenancy” sub-model (Colin 2013), where individuals, farmers’ 
associations or communities make available land to an agribusiness which exploits it for their 
own account (Examples of this sub-model are often found in the plantations sector, such as 
for eucalyptus plantations in the north of Mozambique, managed by Mondi or Sappi); or iii) 
ingrower sub-model, consists of independent farmers or agribusinesses that acquire land for 
his/its own production and provides (un-used) portions of land to selected local farmers or 
employees to cultivate. 
 
First of all, the main aim of these agribusinesses entering primary production is to secure 
supply of production at a lower and more stable price (compared to the prices on the present 
global markets), often in order to sustain the significant investments in (processing) facilities 
in which they are engaged.14 Their strategy is then based on a trade-off between their own 
production (but which implies production risks), contractual arrangements with local farmers 
(with a certain level of transaction costs), and procurement on the spot market (characterized 
by quantity and price fluctuation).  
                                                          
14
 This is the case for the sugar industry for example (it is the case of Illovo), where the mils have to turn a 
certain number of hours a day in order to be economically viable.  
 
Promoted as public-private partnership by national governments and international institutions, 
this strategy is often seen as a “win-win-win” situation for the agribusiness, local/independent 
farmers and the national governments/international donors. The establishment of such models 
is thus often supported and relies on the financial and technical participation of international 
donors and NGOs (For example, the former benefit from financial resources or concessionary 
loans). NGOs and development projects are also involved to secure land rights for the farmer 
associations15 or providing them with inputs.  
 
Agribusiness Estate 
 
This model is characterized by the full vertical integration of the different segments of an 
agricultural value-chain, mainly through foreign multinationals or listed enterprises on foreign 
stock markets. Several forms of such enterprises are identified: 
o Large private agribusinesses, expanding their markets and portfolios; 
o Colonial structures that are being revitalized by the host government, by recalling and 
redeveloping old and faded ties (mostly for the sugarcane plantations and mills in 
Mozambique); 
o Foreign parastatals aimed at securing access to agricultural commodities (for example, for 
food security in the country of origin, etc.). 
These very large projects (often more than 10,000 ha) often rely on irrigated crops, are highly 
mechanized and involve capital-intensive business models. Total integration relates to diverse 
elements. A first element is related to the crop characteristics. This is particularly the case for 
sugarcane production, for example, which necessitates direct transformation. South African 
sugar companies such as Illovo, Tongaat-Hulett and TSB are very well established in the 
region and are presently investing in Southern African countries based on this model. A 
second and more recent tendency is the decision of certain transformation industries to 
integrate primary production. Such processes have been accelerating since the food price 
crisis, the reduction of world food stocks and the increase of basic food commodity prices in 
2008-2009 (mainly with the aim to reduce costs and secure procurement). This is the strategy 
for certain fruit and vegetable transforming enterprises, integrated beef and other meat 
productions. 
The difficult trajectory of SA agricultural investments in Africa 
 
Certain models seem to be developing more in specific countries. All models tend to develop 
in relatively liberal Zambia. Congo tends to rely on a centralized administration, leading to 
models based on bilateral negotiations such the cooperative model, the nucleus-estate and the 
agribusiness one. An intermediary dynamic can be identified in Mozambique, where at the 
national level a more centralized system leads to the larger cooperative/nucleus-estate/asset 
management ones; however, through its provincial administration, independent, associative 
and asset management models are established at provincial level. 
 
Despite these divergences, all the models reflect three common tendencies: a high investment 
failure rate, a tendency to increased value-chain integration and little inclusiveness of local 
populations. 
 
                                                          
15
 The process of land right formalization have been realized through the Iniciativa Terras Comunitarias program 
(ITC) and the soya producers are benefiting from seeds and technical support from Technoserve.  
The rush back home? A large majority of investments are failing 
 
A consensus exists in the research community on the fact that a high proportion of deals that 
are reported by the press are never implemented (Anseeuw et al. 2012). Indeed, the failure of 
a project can happen at different stages of negotiation or implementation. Many investors 
expressed interest or even started the process to get access to land but abandoned the project 
before getting the official recognition of their land rights. Nevertheless, even among the 
project that managed to obtain their formal land rights and started establishing their project, a 
high level of failure had been identified. In this case, we consider a failure of the project when 
the management team of the project left the area for more than a year. A detailed analysis of 
the agricultural projects approved between 2007 and 2012 in four Mozambican provinces 
(Sofala, Manica, Zambezia and Nampula) show the failure of 63% of the projects. This level 
of failure is even higher for the projects dedicated to biofuel production (77%).16 
 
According to the interviews conducted with farm managers, four main reasons explaining this 
high level of failure can be identified. First, the high settling and transaction costs to establish 
a business in Africa. All the project managers interviewed emphasized the necessity of 
collecting soil, climate and land use data in details in order to identify the specific location 
area of the project. On top of these costs, one has to add all the travel expenses, the 
consultancies, the transaction costs related to the understanding of the business environment, 
the cost of land access and the bribes. For a project implying a land access of 5,000 ha, this 
cost is estimated to be between US$500,000 and $750,000. This means, that before acquiring 
the equipment, preparing the land and planting, the investors must be sure to have these funds 
available17 Most of the investors, especially the non-African ones underestimated this 
difficulty. As a result, South African and Zimbabwean consultants and fund managers are 
now particularly targeted by investors to reduce these implementation costs. The second 
reason is the technicality of the projects. Most of the investors underestimate the technical and 
managerial difficulties related to the implementation of large-scale agriculture in often 
difficult ecological, political, bureaucratic and socio-economic environments. The case of the 
South African farmers in Congo illustrates the latter. Being affected by several unconsidered 
technical issues, such as tropical maize pests, etc., their productivity remains far below 
expectations leading to difficulties to honor loans and contractual arrangements. Third, the 
lack of financial resources and services leads the projects into a “cash trap”. Financial services 
used by these projects come from more established economies, such as South Africa or other 
developed countries. Local financial services are very expansive and often not adapted to 
settling investors, especially in agriculture. For example, commercial bank’s interest rates are 
23% in Mozambique for an agricultural company that wants to produce for the domestic 
market. Fourth, the lack of local markets well developed to buy inputs and commercialize the 
production. Exports markets are often difficult to reach, transport costs are high and norms 
and non-tariff barriers frequently impact the individual farmers that can deliver relatively low 
volume and irregular production (particularly in the early phase). 
 
The high failure rate depicts a “not-so–rosy” story concerning the land deals that have been 
implemented. A large number of projects have failed even before effectively starting to 
produce. It pushes many to return to their country of origin, representing a rush back home. 
Others tried to change their investment model (forming associations or implementing 
activities through the cooperative model) or work for other investors (as subcontracting 
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 Author’s calculations based on CPI and CEPAGRI data (2007-2012) and fieldwork monitoring. 
17
 Interviews with farm manager of jatropha projects and business consultants, May 2012. 
farmers for asset management companies or nucleus estate models). This pattern of failure 
leads to rapidly changing strategies of the investors, leading to the typology of models 
presented being dynamic. Failing investors re-strategize and engage in different models as 
they seek new financial resources (including from international cooperation agencies). 
Another implication of this high level of failure is that better-off investors take over the land 
of failed projects leading to more concentrated agrarian structures but also to first hand 
negotiations and local population’s inclusiveness often to be neglected. Moreover, after the 
failure of the project the population can stay or come back on the land but with insecure land 
rights because the land is already identified as a potential area for investors. As generally 
considered in economic development literature, this pattern of even more insecure land rights 
will have consequences on agricultural development of local farmers who already complain 
about the limited access to land to maintain their itinerant farming systems and about the lack 
of possibilities to buy fertilizer to change this farming system.   
 
Vertical coordination - A necessity for success? 
 
An increased tendency towards vertical integration is indeed a common trend observable in all 
the models identified. Not only is there an increasing degree of integration from the first 
independent farmer model towards the last agribusiness estate model; the tendency is also 
observable within each model. Indeed, all of them tend to integrate their activities in an 
overall vertically integrated entity. Moreover the many difficulties encountered by a large 
majority of investors reinforce the conviction among investors that vertical integration is the 
way forward. 
 
This integration process encompasses not only the farm itself, but often integrates the entire 
chain of agriculture-related activities, including seed supply, processing, machinery, storage, 
transport, marketing, and in some cases outlets, shops and restaurants. The approach is not 
new, and several agricultural export sub-sectors (such as coffee, cotton, etc.) are already 
structured according to this model, particularly in Latin America (Rabobank 2011). However, 
over the past few years, this strategy has been applied more widely, both geographically 
(Southern Africa) and across agricultural sub-sectors (meat, cereal, etc.).  
 
This process of vertical integration or coordination is driven by local and international factors. 
Firstly, according to Vermeulen et al. (2010) investors expect a reversal of the risk/profit 
relationship within the production value chains because of the increased interest and increased 
commodity prices. Whereas primary production constituted until now the main risk factor, 
with profits returning to downstream and upstream actors, the increase in agricultural prices 
now tends, at least according to investors’ strategies, to invert this relationship benefiting as 
such the primary production activities. This leads to agribusinesses or other corporates to 
integrate primary agricultural production in their portfolios, developing strategies to secure 
fixed supply and reduce the risk of commodity price volatility. Secondly, avoiding the above-
mentioned obstacles is another main reason for investors to vertically integrate. Vertical 
integration is a frequently applied strategy in order to overcome market imperfections. The 
more the coordination goes toward integrated forms, the more the risk decreases, resource 
access is secured and bargaining power is strengthened (Reardon et al. 2009).  
 
Few inclusive agricultural development models 
 
These failures and the necessary vertical integration lead to few inclusive agricultural 
development models. This leads to three direct consequences. The first one is related to the 
challenges for local farmers to participate and benefit from the present land and agricultural 
investments as the latter tend to be more and more integrated. This integration, and by 
consequence the increasingly closed nature of the developing value-chains, implies large-
scale land acquisitions to represent exclusive rather than inclusive development models. 
Related to this, the second one concerns the ‘isolation’ of many of the foreign investments. 
Indeed, as very few inclusive models are being developed, and a lack of relationships being 
created with local farmers and stakeholders, many of the foreign investments remain isolated 
and are developed as “enclave economies” poorly integrated to their surrounding society and 
economies (Ferguson 2005). The third one concerns overall agricultural development, in 
particular for local economies and populations. Based on the present observations, success of 
these investments does not necessarily mean the development of local agricultural economies. 
Although some models and specific projects do endeavor to integrate local development 
objectives in their model, several avoid it, particularly since the core establishment of the 
projects tends to be difficult. When some projects include certain social aspects, the capacity 
of such measures to structurally change local economies remains limited. 
 
Where local populations are excluded from development initiatives, an escalation of 
competition into conflict is a significant risk. In many cases, popular discontent has so far 
taken the form of peaceful advocacy and protest movements (Matavel et al. 2012). Where 
injustice is seen as unresolved, the risk that such disputes and movements lead to direct and 
violent confrontations is real (Madagascar being the major example in Southern Africa) 
(Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 2011). 
Conclusion: Towards a major agrarian transformation in Africa? 
 
The above structural elements result into a renewed configuration of the agricultural 
production model in South Africa, echoing agricultural transformations in other countries, 
such as Argentina with the development of the “pool de siembra” (Guibert & Sili, 2009). 
Confronted to the inertness of the South African agricultural sector and of its transformation, 
these innovations seem to challenge, although still at the margins, the monopoly of South 
Africa’s “traditional” and inherited agrarian and corporate capitals. Indeed, while the 
deregulation and liberalization processes blocked the possibilities for an alternative path of 
accumulation within the sector, it has created opportunities for the expansion of financial 
capital into South African agriculture and agribusiness. This financial capital –and thus the 
transformations it implies - is originating from outside the sector, if not from outside the 
country. It also led to renewed associations, particularly with international finance, who 
perceive these transformations not only as an ideal set-up and models for investment in South 
Africa, but also as a stepping stone to the rest of the continent. As such South Africa, is not 
only affected by, it also acts as an actor and an intermediary for agricultural expansion into 
Africa. 
 
 
Through the export of its farmers, agricultural expertise and agribusinesses, South Africa is 
certainly contributing to the development of a sector that remains largely underdeveloped in 
many of the African countries. This is certainly the discourse the South African government is 
emphasizing in order to legitimize its support to these initiatives. These South African 
investments not only initiate and contribute to production in the African countries, they also 
impulse needed institutional and organizational changes in agricultural value chains. This 
being said, their investments are based on large-scale farming models and oligopolistic value-
chains  (a strong legacy of South Africa’s development model) exporting de facto the South 
African apartheid-based dual and corporate agrarian paradigm.  
 
The global land rush has profound economic and social implications for agrarian societies. 
Some are direct, such as the loss of land as well as the loss of livelihood; other are indirect 
and concern, among others, women’s land rights (Daley 2011, HLPE 2011), water access 
(Woodhouse 2012, Adamczewski et al. 2013), environmental degradation through 
intensification (Horne 2011), and loss of biodiversity (Deininger et al. 2011). In addition to 
these already well-described, case-study illustrated consequences, the analysis detailed in this 
paper reflects profound economic and social transformations in agricultural structures and 
contextualizes the large-scale land phenomenon according to broader agrarian dynamics. 
Besides Borras et al. (2012), detailing emerging dynamics of changes in land use and property 
relations, the above presented typology of large-scale land acquisition models and their 
dynamics provide a strong basis to illustrate the dynamics that can trigger agrarian 
transformations in Southern Africa. 
 
A first significant element of Southern Africa’s agricultural structural transformation is the 
far-reaching vertical integration process, related to integration of the different value-chain 
segments. As illustrated through the different models presented in this paper, large-scale land 
acquisitions go along with the increasing control over the various segments of a value-chain. 
Either implemented voluntarily or as a necessitating strategy used by investors, it results in 
the establishment and development of structures and enterprises that are significant in size. 
On one hand, it leads to the “corporatization” of agriculture. This dynamic is not related to 
mechanization per se but rather to a transformation of the production structures (Anseeuw et 
al. 2011). As such, the agricultural value-chains are increasingly controlled by a few 
dominant actors, mainly corporates. On the other hand, in the presence of advanced vertical 
integration through which companies not only control the primary production but also the 
upstream and downstream activities, closed value-chains tend to be developed. Not only does 
it result in companies controlling the productive cycle and its markets (for example, export of 
total production (McMichael 2012)), it also results in these companies intervening as a 
regulator within these value-chains, directly controlling supply quotas, price setting, 
production norms, etc. (Bernstein 1996). 
 
A second element is related to the “financialization” of the agricultural sector. As 
emphasized by the different models presented in this paper, investment in land and in 
agricultural production is not just engaging agribusinesses and farmers solely; financial 
investors, asset management funds and companies are now important stakeholders in the 
agricultural sector. As such, originating from industrial or financial sectors, engaging as 
entrepreneurs, investors or even as pure speculators, the suppliers of capital seem more and 
more exogenous to the agricultural sector. These new actors import into the agricultural sector 
new practices, business logics, modes of actions and outside experiences. Their interactions 
and inputs alter the sector’s "traditional" modes of action, investment and production. 
Through the increasing role and direct engagement into the sector of investors and financial 
actors, and their use of advanced financial instruments (such as future markets), 
“financialization” of the agricultural sector is taking place, which is redefining the traditional 
borders of the agricultural sector (Anseeuw et al. 2011). 
 
A third point deals with foreignization of space (Zoomers 2010). In South Africa the 
dominant investors, which include commercial banks, investment funds and certain former 
cooperatives, are domestically based. However, the different entities (agribusinesses, 
investment funds, etc.) investing in other Southern African countries are often foreign based, 
even if domestic elites are involved as partners in the projects (Fairbairn 2013). But in both 
cases, the financial structures of these bodies are increasingly globalised (McMichael 2012). 
The fact that investors are foreign is not a problem in itself. It can however become an issue 
as these actors are acting within closed value-chains, according to principles (such as the 
financial ones) borrowed from other sectors. As foreign economic powers control more and 
more land and segments of value-chains, they transfer regulatory powers on domestic issues 
such as local rural development and agricultural development abroad, raising questions as to 
the decisions over standards, norms and regulation mechanisms applied within these value 
chains and countries. It leads to a foreignization not only of the sector, but also of its 
regulatory mechanisms (Bülher et al. 2012). 
 
The fourth element of agrarian transformation is linked to a concentration and dualization 
process of the agricultural sector. On one hand, the establishment of large-scale projects 
inevitably leads to concentration in the Southern African agricultural sector. Indeed, the dual 
processes of vertical integration and financialization/corporatization leads to an agricultural 
sector characterised by the dominion of a few large international food-business groups 
(Huggins 2011). This pattern of concentration is reinforced by the high level of failure of the 
projects because the better-off investors buy-out the projects that are failing. On the other 
hand, as shown through the non-inclusiveness of the investment models, the large majority of 
the rural masses and smallholder farmers are excluded from the investment processes 
(intentionally in order to avoid risks and transaction costs or due to the negative results 
achieved and the refocus on core activities). Here too, marginalisation is intensified through 
often biased competition and unequal power relations. This results in agrarian economies that 
are developing at dual speeds and in different directions, with concentration, marginalization 
and dualization processes at stake. With mega-structures being established, that are 
swallowing medium-sized entities (mainly taking over the land from the many failures), and 
with smallholders being excluded, the present large-scale land acquisition process is leading 
to a sector characterised by extreme dualization. 
 
Finally, the fifth element is related to social transformations. While the emergence of these 
production models has the potential to generate numerous economic related transformations, 
social impacts should also be highlighted. Not only are many excluded from these processes, 
leading to the transformation of dispossessed peasants to “surplus people” (Li 2011). Those 
able to access these value chains find themselves incorporated into production chains in which 
they are isolated actors with no decision-making or orientation power. The incorporation 
process of family-based producers by macro-actors and corporates thus modifies their 
relationships with the sector. As such, this situation not only changes the social relations of 
property and land, as emphasized by Borras et al. (2012), but also changes the social status of 
the farmers. Although in some cases they remain the owners of the land, their situation is 
increasingly similar to that of proletarian agricultural employees or even just rent-seekers. 
Generally, the technical capital used, characterized by ever-increasing costs, does not belong 
to them but is made available, owned and managed by the management company (Anseeuw et 
al. 2012).  
 
Is Southern Africa effectively undergoing large-scale and profound agrarian transformations? 
The question is all the more relevant as, on one hand, large-scale land projects remain 
relatively small in number (all models included, Zambia counts 13 reported deals; 
Mozambique 124 and Republic of Congo 7 (Land Matrix 2011)) and, on the other hand, most 
of these deals, as detailed in this paper, are failing. This being said, several elements allow us 
to emphasize the significance of the trends detailed here above and the large-scale 
implications of the process on the sector. Firstly, since it concerns large-scale initiatives, it 
does concern a significant proportion of the arable land of these countries. As such, in 
Mozambique for example, large-scale land right attribution for agriculture to foreign investors 
between 2007 and 2011 accounted for at least 955 000 ha,18 representing 15% of the available 
land suitable for agriculture.19 Secondly, as described in the paper, the establishments finally 
developing are structures that are strongly integrated, controlling important parts of the 
agrarian economy or of specific commodities through closed value-chains. As is the case in 
Brazil and Argentina (Rabobank 2011), and to a lesser extent in South Africa (Anseeuw et al. 
2013), the few corporate structures tend to concentrate power and develop an oligopolistic 
sector. Although small in number, the trend of land rights attributed to them and thus the 
implication for the sector are significant. Lastly, these restructurings could be long term and 
strongly embedded, as the large-scale farm development paradigm is presently openly 
promoted. Not only do smallholders benefit little from present agricultural investment 
dynamics, but also agricultural policies and support measures tend to shift away from the 
former towards the facilitation of large-scale investment. In most cases, smallholders tend to 
be more than ever excluded from present dynamics and policies. As such, a new agricultural 
development paradigm has been emerging (De Janvry 2010), or rather a new one has become 
dominant in official discourses, manifesting itself both at the national and international levels. 
Agricultural development centered on large-scale commercial and corporate farming has 
become the reigning paradigm. Conveyed by investors, it is presently being promoted by the 
different governments in the region, as well as being spread across the continent through 
public development agencies. 
 
So, although Southern Africa’s agrarian transformations are not broad-based, the control by a 
few has wide-ranging implications for the agricultural sector. These implications are directly 
related to the transformation of the countries’ agrarian societies through corporatization, 
financialization, concentration, dualization, and foreignization. They also cause a shift 
towards a dominant corporate-based paradigm and lead to questions regarding the future of 
small-scale commercial farming within agricultural development. 
 
References 
 
Adamczewski, A., J.-Y. Jamin, P. Burnod and J.-P. Tonneau. 2013. Terre, eau et capitaux: 
investissements ou accaparements fonciers à l’Office du Niger? Cahiers Agricultures 22(1), 22-32. 
 
Andrianirina-Ratsialonana, R., L. Ramarojohn, P. Burnod and A. Teyssier. 2011. After Daewoo? 
Current status and perspectives of large scale land acquisitions in Madagascar. Commercial Pressures 
on Land. ILC. Rome, Observatoire du Foncier/CIRAD. 
 
Anseeuw, W., M. Boche, T. Breu, M. Giger, J. Lay, P. Messerli and K. Nolte. 2012. Transnational 
land deals for agriculture in the global south. Analytical report based on the Land Matrix Database. 
Bern/Montpellier/Hamburg: CDE/CIRAD/GIGA. 
 
Anseeuw, W., A. Ducastel and M. Boche. 2013. Nouveaux modèles de production et d'investissement 
en Afrique du Sud. Etudes rurales(2), 147-160. 
                                                          
18
 This total number does not include the forestry concessions as well as the project for wildlife breeding. 
19
 Author calculation from CPI and CEPAGRI data monitored on the ground and estimation of arable land 
available and suitable for agriculture realized during the Agroecological zoning. 
 Anseeuw, W., A. Ducastel and J.-J. Gabas. 2011. The end of the African peasant? From investment 
funds and finance value chains to peasant related questions. International Conference on Global Land 
Grabbing. Brighton, UK. 
 
Bernstein, H. 1996. The political economy of the maize filière. The Journal of Peasant Studies 23(2-
3), 120-145. 
 
Bernstein, H. 2013. Commercial Agriculture in South Africa since 1994: ‘Natural, Simply 
Capitalism’. Journal of Agrarian Change 13(1), 23-46. 
 
Boche, M. and W. Anseeuw. 2013. Unraveling Land Grabbing: Different models of large-
scale land acquisition in Southern Africa. LDPI Working Paper. T. L. D. P. Initiative: 32. 
 
Borras, S. and J. Franco. 2010. From Threat to Opportunity-Problems with the Idea of a Code of 
Conduct for Land-Grabbing. Yale Hum. Rts. & Dev. LJ 13, 507. 
 
Borras, S. J. M. and J. C. Franco. 2012. Global Land Grabbing and Trajectories of Agrarian Change: 
A Preliminary Analysis. Journal of Agrarian Change 12(1), 34-59. 
 
Bülher, E.-A., M. Guibert and D. Requier-Desjardins. 2012. Business Agriculture : Definition and 
questions from South American realities. 6eme journées de recherche en sciences sociales INRA-
SFER-CIRAD, Toulouse. 
 
Burnod, P., J.-P. Colin, F. Ruf, S. Freguin-Gresh, J. Clerc, G. Faure, I. Vagneron, W. Anseeuw, E. 
Cheyns and G. Vognan. 2012. Large-scale agricultural investments and inclusion of smallholder 
farmers: lessons of experiences in 7 southern countries. Land Tenure Working Paper. FAO. 
Rome/Montpellier, FAO/CIRAD. 23. 
 
Burnod, P., M. Gingembre and R. Andrianirina Ratsialonana. 2013. Competition over Authority and 
Access: International Land Deals in Madagascar. Development and change 44(2), 357-379. 
Buxton, A., M. Campanale and L. Cotula. 2012. Farms and funds: investment funds in the global land 
rush. IIED Briefing papers. IIED. London. 
 
Cochet, H. and M. Merlet. 2011. Land grabbing and share of the value added in agricultural processes. 
A new look at the distribution of land revenues. International Academic Conference "Global Land 
Grabbing" 6-8 April. 
 
Colin, J.-P. 2013. Marchés fonciers et concentration foncière : la configuration de "tenure inversée" 
(reverse tenancy). Les Cahiers du Pôle Foncier. Montpellier, Pôle Foncier. 3: 29. 
 
Cotula, L. 2012. The international political economy of the global land rush: A critical appraisal of 
trends, scale, geography and drivers. The Journal of Peasant Studies 39(3-4), 649-680. 
 
Cotula, L., S. Vermeulen, R. Leonard and J. Keeley. 2010. Land grab or development opportunity? 
agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa. London/Rome: IIED/FAO/IFAD. 
 
Cousins, B. 2013. Smallholder Irrigation Schemes, Agrarian Reform and ‘Accumulation from Above 
and from Below’ in South Africa. Journal of Agrarian Change 13(1), 116-139. 
 
Daley, E. 2011. Gendered impacts of commercial pressures on land. Commercial Pressures on Land. 
Rome, ILC: 67. 
 
De Janvry, A. 2010. Agriculture for development: new paradigm and options for success. Agricultural 
Economics 41, 17-36. 
 
Deininger, K. W. and D. Byerlee. 2011. Rising global interest in farmland: can it yield sustainable and 
equitable benefits?, World Bank Publications. 
 
Ducastel, A. and W. Anseeuw. 2013. Agriculture as an asset class: Financialisation of the South 
African farming sector. The Fourth Annual Conference in Political Economy, The Hague. 
 
Fairbairn, M. 2013. Indirect Dispossession: Domestic Power Imbalances and Foreign Access to Land 
in Mozambique. Development and change 44(2), 335-356. 
 
Favrot, M. 2012. L'investissement de fermiers sud-africains dans l'agriculture congolaise: 
accaparement foncier ou opportunité? Paris, AgroParistech. Master. 
 
Ferguson, J. 2005. Seeing Like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in Neoliberal 
Africa. American Anthropologist 107(3), 377-382. 
 
Freguin-Gresh, S., M. d'Haese and W. Anseeuw. 2012. Demythifying contract farming: Evidence from 
rural South Africa. Agrekon 51(3), 24-51. 
 
Hall, R. 2011. Land grabbing in Southern Africa: the many faces of the investor rush. Review of 
African Political Economy 38(128), 193-214. 
 
Hall, R. 2012. The next Great Trek? South African commercial farmers move north. The Journal of 
Peasant Studies 39(3-4), 823-843. 
 
Hammar, A. 2010. Ambivalent Mobilities: Zimbabwean Commercial Farmers in Mozambique. 
Journal of Southern African Studies 36(2), 395-416. 
 
HLPE. 2011. Land tenure and international investment in agriculture. Rome, Committee on World 
Food Security. 
 
Horne, F. 2011. Understanding land deals in Africa: Country report, Ethiopia. Understanding land 
deals. San Francisco, Oakland Institute. 
 
Huggins, C. 2011. Commercial pressure on land in its historical perspective. Commercial Pressures on 
land. Rome, ILC. 
 
Lahiff, E., N. Davis and T. Manenzhe. 2012. Joint ventures in agriculture: Lessons from land reform 
projects in South Africa: IIED. 
 
Land Matrix. 2011. CDE/CIRAD/ILC/GIGA/GIZ. 
 
Li, T. M. 2011. Centering labor in the land grab debate. The Journal of Peasant Studies 38(2), 281-
298. 
Louw, A., D. Chikazunga, D. Jordaan and E. Biénabe. 2007. Restructuring food markets in South 
Africa: Dynamics within the context of the tomato subsector. Regoverning Markets Agrifood Sector 
Studies. London, IIED. 
 
Matavel, N., S. Dolores and V. Cabanelas. 2012. Lords of the Land: preliminary analysis of the 
phenomenon of landgrabbing in Mozambique. Maputo, UNAC. 
 
McCarthy, J. F. 2010. Processes of inclusion and adverse incorporation: oil palm and agrarian change 
in Sumatra, Indonesia. The Journal of Peasant Studies 37(4), 821-850. 
 McMichael, P. 2012. The land grab and corporate food regime restructuring. The Journal of Peasant 
Studies 39(3-4), 681-701. 
 
Ménard, C. 2004. The economics of hybrid organizations. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical 
Economics (JITE)/Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 160(3), 345-376. 
 
Nhantumbo, I. and A. Salomão. 2010. Biofuels, land access and rural livelihoods in Mozambique. 
London: IIED. 
 
O’Brien, E. 2011. Irregular and illegal land acquisition by Kenya’s elites: Trends, processes and 
impacts of the Kenya’s land grabbing phenomenon. Commercial Pressures on Land. Rome, 
International Land Coalition. 
 
Peluso, N. L. and C. Lund. 2011. New frontiers of land control: Introduction. The Journal of Peasant 
Studies 38(4), 667-681. 
 
Pitcher, M. A. 1998. Disruption without transformation: agrarian relations and livelihoods in Nampula 
province, Mozambique 1975–1995. Journal of Southern African Studies 24(1), 115-140. 
 
Rabobank. 2011. New Models of Farming in Argentina. Rabobank Industry Note. R. International. 
Amsterdam, Rabobank. 
 
Reardon, T. and C. B. Barrett. 2000. Agroindustrialization, globalization, and international 
development: an overview of issues, patterns, and determinants. Agricultural Economics 
23(3), 195-205. 
 
Reardon, T., C. B. Barrett, J. A. Berdegué and J. F. M. Swinnen. 2009. Agrifood Industry 
Transformation and Small Farmers in Developing Countries. World Development 37(11), 1717-1727. 
 
Reardon, T and J Berdegué (2002) The rapid rise of supermarkets in Latin America: 
challenges and opportunities for development, in Development Policy Review, September 
 
Schut, M., M. Slingerland and A. Locke. 2010. Biofuel developments in Mozambique. Update and 
analysis of policy, potential and reality. Energy Policy 38(9), 5151-5165. 
 
Vermeulen, S. and L. Cotula. 2010. Making the most of agricultural investment: A survey of business 
models that provide opportunities for smallholders. London/Rome/Bern: IIED/FAO/IFAD/SDC. 
 
Williamson, O. E. 1991. Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural 
alternatives. Administrative science quarterly 36(2), 269-296. 
 
Woodhouse, P. 2012. New investment, old challenges. Land deals and the water constraint in African 
agriculture. Journal of Peasant Studies 39(3-4), 777-794. 
 
Zoomers, A. 2010. Globalisation and the foreignisation of space: seven processes driving the current 
global land grab. The Journal of Peasant Studies 37(2), 429-447. 
 
 
